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Traditionally, state and local government building codes have 
served as the minimum standards in the United States for the 
construction industry; however, with the recent nationwide emphasis 
on more environmentally friendly building policies, many 
governments have turned to third-party verification programs to 
ensure that real estate development meets green building objectives.1 
Based on their inherent police powers, state and local governments 
are able to exercise land use regulation to restrict private interests on 
property so long as the regulation protects the health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare of the public.2 Many local governments exercise 
this power on private real property through zoning ordinances and 
building codes.3 
Some of the earliest examples of zoning in the United States 
include ordinances aimed at health and safety concerns.4 Likewise, 
many state and local governments decided to require and incentivize 
high performance or green building components for development 
 
1 BROOKS RAINWATER WITH COOPER MARTIN & BRENDAN KARA, LOCAL LEADERS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY: GREEN BUILDING POLICY IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 4 
(2009), http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/document/aiab081614.pdf 
(explaining that the number of municipalities with green building programs increased from 
92 to 138 between 2007 and 2009. This fifty percent increase coincided with the detail that 
“24 of the 25 most populated metropolitan regions in the United States are built around 
cities with a green building policy.”). 
2 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9 (2d ed. 1993). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. § 9.3 (“[T]he British colonies frequently enacted regulatory ordinances banning 
slaughter houses, gunpowder mills, and the like to the outskirts of the municipality.”). 
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projects within their jurisdictions due to safety and productivity 
concerns for their residents and the local environment.5 
Depending on a given government’s strategy and limitations, it will 
choose different approaches for accomplishing these policy 
objectives. In some instances, the government will choose to develop 
its own standards for determining whether a project conforms to its 
goals. Other times, it may select standards developed by an 
independent and private third-party organization. 
With these recent trends as a backdrop, scholarly legal literature 
has only started to explore the statutes, ordinances, and regulations 
that compel or incentivize private developers to obtain recognition 
from private third-party verification organizations. Additionally, 
possible antitrust implications could arise among those government 
entities seeking to promote green building initiatives, the third parties 
providing standards, and private sector real estate and construction 
stakeholders. This Article seeks to address these issues. In Part I we 
present current green building regulatory structures, including an in-
depth discussion of both third-party and government-designed 
programs.6 In Part II we examine the various requirements and 
incentives that the three levels of government—federal, state, and 
local—consider when implementing green building initiatives.7 In 
Part III we explore and analyze the antitrust implications that may 
develop in the relationship between private third-party programs 
engaged in green building initiatives with various levels of 
government.8 We conclude this part with a discussion of where these 
relationships may proceed with little risk of antitrust liability, as well 
as those relationships where risk may indeed exist. Finally, in Part IV 
we assess government adoption standards.9 
 
5 See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., BLDG. CODE ch. 13C, § 101.2 (2010), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2008standards/ordinances/sanfrancisco/2010-12-29 
_San_Francisco_Green_Building_amendments.pdf (“The purpose of this chapter 
[imposing green building requirements on private development] is to promote the health, 
safety and welfare of San Francisco residents, workers, and visitors by minimizing the use 
and waste of energy, water and other resources in the construction and operation of 
buildings in the City and County of San Francisco and by providing a healthy indoor 
environment.”). 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 10–86. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 87–175. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 175–261. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 262–67. 
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I 
CURRENT GREEN BUILDING REGULATORY STRUCTURES 
Once a jurisdiction decides to pursue environmental policies that 
coincide with sustainable development or green building, either an 
owner seeking to take advantage of an offered incentive or the 
sponsoring governmental entity must decide on how to achieve 
compliance. Usually, the offered program prescribes a specific 
method for compliance or provides for alternatives. In choosing a 
program, the sponsoring governmental entity must select between the 
classic business options of whether to develop a compliance standard 
internally or select one created by an independent third party. 
Accordingly, we will evaluate the major national third-party programs 
adopted by many jurisdictions, as well as some noteworthy 
governmental standards. 
A. Third-Party Programs Available for Adoption 
While interest in green building in the United States dates back to 
the late nineteenth century, there was a modern resurgence after the 
energy crisis of the 1970s.10 Many of the major environmental 
organizations began insisting upon holistic methods and requirements 
in designs for their office buildings.11 These efforts led to the 
“Architecture at Crossroads” meeting in 1993 where the International 
Union of Architects and the American Institute of Architects (AIA) 
put forward the Declaration of Interdependence for a Sustainable 
Future.12 This document established fundamental principles and 
practices to enable sustainable development.13 
Subsequently, the AIA published its “Environmental Resources 
Guide” in 1994, with a more in-depth update in 1996.14 The Rocky 
Mountain Institute released its own publication called “A Primer on 
Sustainable Building” in 1995, and a joint effort by the U.S. 
Department of Energy and Public Technology, Inc. created the 
“Sustainable Building Technical Manual” in 1996.15 From these 
initial efforts, several organizations determined the need to provide a 
 
10 CHARLES K. KIBERT, SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION: GREEN BUILDING DESIGN AND 
DELIVERY 47–49 (John Wiley & Sons 2d. ed. 2007). 
11 Id. at 47. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
PRUM 7/10/2012  9:24 AM 
2012] In Third Parties We Trust? 195 
recognizable system that could quantify and verify the sustainability 
features within a given construction project. 
1. United States Green Building Counsel—Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design 
The now ubiquitous Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) green building rating system was created by the 
United States Green Building Council (USGBC) in 1998. Generally 
considered to be the predominant green building assessment tool, it 
was the product of a thorough development process that took place 
over four years under the direction of Rob Watson of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council.16 During this time, the USGBC members 
involved with LEED’s development decided to pursue a market-
driven approach through which individual building owners would 
decide the program’s fate, rather than compelling compliance through 
regulations.17 In addition, LEED’s early developers sought a broad-
based program that could meet the diverse needs of various 
participants in the building industry to ensure its acceptance as a 
workable system.18 
As such, the LEED program encompasses a collection of rating 
systems that provide measurements of a building’s green features.19 
Within this collection, the LEED program maintains different 
certification tracks for New Construction (NC), Existing Buildings: 
Operations and Maintenance (EB: O&M), Commercial Interiors (CI), 
Core and Shell (CS), Homes (H), and Neighborhood Development 
(ND).20 Even though the developers of the program originally 
intended it to apply to office buildings, the program has expanded to 
include applications for lodging, retail stores, school campuses, 
volume building programs, healthcare facilities, laboratories, and 
multifamily residences.21 
Guided by the LEED program type, a governing committee 
established by the USGBC creates tailored requirements for 
certification through a template that distributes points into several 
 
16 See id. at 56, 77 (noting that another program actually preceded LEED, but it failed 
due to the decision to create a system based on the standards structure of the ASTM). 
17 Id. at 56. 
18 Id. at 57. 
19 Id. 
20 See Rating Systems, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Display 
Page.aspx?CMSPageID=222 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
21 Id. 
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categories based on consensus-driven sustainable practices.22 The 
points assigned to each category create a weighting system—based on 
the developing committee’s judgment—for the various attributes and 
set forth minimum standards for compliance.23 A project may achieve 
certification when it demonstrates that all of the points earned in each 
of the different categories surpass the thresholds established by the 
committee.24 The LEED program also allows for additional 
recognition noted as Silver, Gold, or Platinum when a project attains 
higher point totals than required for basic certification.25 
To determine whether a project meets the certification standard, the 
LEED program utilizes a documentation-based verification 
approach.26 A project must meet certain basic prerequisites for 
sustainable practices, while the program also provides options in other 
areas for an adaptable compliance standard against a set menu of 
choices.27 By allowing this flexibility, the LEED program standard 
takes into account geographic variability while ensuring a level of 
sustainable compliance for each project it endorses through 
certification. 
To start the process, an applicant must first register the project 
through LEED Online.28 At that time, the applicant will provide 
identifying information for the project; the applicant must consent to 
the LEED Project Registration Agreement and pay the registration 
fee.29 As the design and construction process proceeds, the applicant 
will apply for LEED certification and technical review. When an 
applicant submits for this recognition, the verification process 
 
22 LEED Committees, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org 
/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1750 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). See also What LEED 
Measures, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMS 
PageID=1989 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (noting that LEED promotes a whole building 
design approach by recognizing critical inputs from fundamental areas such as siting, 
water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental 
quality, locations and linkages, awareness and education, innovation in design, and 
regional priorities). 
23 See How to Achieve Certification, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc 
.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1991 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
24 GREEN BLDG. CERTIFICATION INST., LEED CERTIFICATION POLICY MANUAL 4 
(2011), available at http://www.gbci.org/Libraries/Certification_Resources/LEED_ND 
_Certification_Policy_Manual.sflb.ashx. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at ¶ 11. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. ¶ 9. 
29 Id. 
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requires corroborating evidence through documents, attestations, data, 
and other information that supports compliance with each point 
applied toward the total needed for certification.30 Upon a final 
review, a project will receive a determination as to the certification, 
level awarded, or denial of overall certification or individual credits.31 
Given the flexibility and thoroughness of the LEED program, 
many different governmental entities found the verification and 
certification aspects of the LEED program sufficiently rigorous and 
reliable; as a result, they have adopted it for use within their own 
jurisdictions to promote sustainable policy objectives. 
2. Green Building Institute—Green Globes 
Offering its own approach to assessing a building’s sustainable 
characteristics, Green Globes is another popular rating system that has 
achieved sizeable market penetration in North America. This system 
is derived from the United Kingdom’s Building Research 
Establishment’s Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) 
developed in 1992. It encompasses the oldest efforts—dating back to 
1988—to advance high performance standards when constructing 
office buildings in England.32 The Canadian government and trade 
organizations adopted this program using the name Go Green Plus, 
which grew to be very popular.33 In the United States, the Green 
Building Institute (GBI) owns and operates the Green Globes 
system—the first third-party verification approach to receive 
accreditation by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).34 
As is common with assessment standards produced by 
governmental building research organizations, the Green Globes 
system provides a tool to assist developers in meeting market demand 
for environmentally sensitive buildings.35 The current programs offer 
rating systems for new construction and for the continual 
 
30 Id. at 13. Since LEED now encompasses a collection of rating systems, the 
requirements, schedule, and policies will vary accordingly. Id. at 18. 
31 Id. at 18–20 (explaining that the process does allow a project to file an appeal for 
further consideration should a dispute occur). 
32 See KIBERT, supra note 10, at 65. 
33 See What is Green Globes?, GREEN GLOBES, http://www.greenglobes.com/about.asp 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2012); see also Green Globes Tools, ANSI/GBI STANDARD, 
http://www.thegbi.org/green-globes/ansi-gbi-standard.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
34 Id. (noting that the USGBC did not achieve this designation until 2009, and the 
LEED system itself is not ANSI-accredited). 
35 See KIBERT, supra note 10, at 56. 
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improvement of existing buildings.36 In rating a project, the system 
utilizes a questionnaire-based method where the construction 
documents section of the program provides the source for attaining a 
given level of qualification.37 In other words, qualification is based on 
self-assessment. Nonetheless, a GBI authorized assessor must validate 
the qualification to promote a building as Green Globes-certified.38 
More specifically, Green Globes evaluates a project based on an 
assignment of points for the following categories: the Project 
Management Policies and Practices; the chosen Site; an Energy 
component; a Water factor; the use of Resources, Building Materials, 
and Solid Waste; an evaluation of Emissions and Effluents; and the 
Indoor Environment.39 When the project achieves a minimum of 
thirty-five percent of the available points, it qualifies for formal 
certification.40 At that time, an independent third-party assessor 
reviews the documentation and actually visits the project to complete 
an evaluation.41 The assessor then gives a recommendation to the GBI 
for the appropriate level of certification for the project on a scale of 
one to four green globes.42 
Commentator and academic Charles Kibert points out some of the 
distinctive aspects of the Green Globes system in contrast to LEED.43 
He explains that, in the LEED system, a project team completes and 
submits documents electronically to an evaluation group, but those 
with intimate knowledge of the project neither contact nor discuss the 
project and its green features with the reviewers.44 Furthermore, the 
independent assessor in Green Globes physically examines the project 
to determine whether what was promised was actually built in the 
 
36 Green Globes Overview, GREEN BLDG. INITIATIVE, http://www.TheGBI.org /green-
globes/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Green Globes]. 
37 Green Globes New Construction, GREEN GLOBES INITIATIVE, http://www.thegbi.org 
/green-globes/new-construction.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Green 
Globes New Construction]; Green Globes Continual Improvement of Existing Buildings, 
GREEN BLDG. INITIATIVE, http://www.TheGBI.org/green-globes/continual-improvement   
-for-existing-buildings.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Green Globes 
Continual Improvement of Existing Buildings]. 
38 See Green Globes, supra note 36. 
39 See Green Globes New Construction & Green Globes Continual Improvement of 
Existing Buildings, supra note 37 (noting that the Green Globes Continual Improvement of 
Existing Buildings contains the same categories minus the one for siting). 
40 See Green Globes, supra note 36. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See KIBERT, supra note 10, at 65. 
44 Id. 
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field, a step that is not required under current versions of LEED.45 
Finally, Green Globes uses a variable method to calculate the total 
achievable points, whereas LEED utilizes a fixed system.46 
Accordingly, Green Globes includes only those categories and 
subcategories available to a project; the LEED system does not reduce 
its certification criteria for characteristics that may be outside of a 
development’s control.47 
Hence, Green Globes limits its scope to the work of the project 
team while ignoring issues outside its control to provide a viable and 
robust third-party evaluation system for jurisdictions looking to 
include a compliance aspect to their green or high performance 
building policies. 
3. National Association of Home Builders—ICC 700 
In an attempt to provide a more specific third-party verification 
system for homes across the country, the National Association of 
Home Builders (NAHB) unveiled its latest initiative to provide 
residential green building certification.48 The NAHB partnered with 
the International Code Council (ICC)49 to create the ICC 700 National 
Green Building Standard in 2007.50 The ICC 700 was the first 
residential green building rating system accredited by the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI),51 and it continues to battle 
USGBC’s LEED for Homes rating system for overall market share. 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citing situations like building on a brownfield or not locating a project near a bus 
stop as examples where Green Globes adjusts the achievable point total in contrast to the 
lack of flexibility contained in the LEED program). 
48 See generally About NAHB Model Green, NAT’L GREEN BLDG. PROGRAM, 
http://www.nahbgreen.org/AboutNAHBGreen/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
49 About ICC, INT’L CODE COUNCIL, http://www.iccsafe.org/AboutICC/Pages/default 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (“The International Code Council (ICC) was established 
in 1994 as a non-profit organization dedicated to developing a single set of comprehensive 
and coordinated national model construction codes.”). 
50 ICC 700 National Green Building Standard, NAT’L GREEN BLDG. PROGRAM, 
http://www.nahbgreen.org/NGBS/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). The NAHB 
initially launched its program in 2006 without the ICC. See Darren A. Prum, Green 
Buildings, High Performance Buildings, and Sustainable Construction: Does it Really 
Matter What We Call Them?, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 26 (2010) (noting that in its original 
form, the National Green Building program offered a builder a checklist of requirements 
with different levels of achievement that allowed for self-certification instead of the 
current method that provides third-party verification). 
51 Id. 
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In putting together its program, the NAHB incorporated mandatory 
prerequisites that all projects must achieve in order to earn 
certification.52 Projects must also earn points from all six of the 
program’s categories to maintain certification.53 These categories 
include “lot and site development; energy, water, and resource 
efficiency; indoor environmental quality; and homeowner 
education.”54 
Similar to other programs, a project can earn Bronze, Silver, Gold, 
or Emerald certification based on overall green building features 
incorporated into the structure.55 The Emerald certification, which is 
the highest, requires a home to incorporate energy savings of sixty 
percent over the baseline.56 However, in a stark contrast to other 
rating systems, an ICC 700 project’s highest level of certification is 
set by its lowest category score level.57 
Distinct from the other private, third-party verification systems, the 
NAHB program has unique characteristics due to its relationship with 
the ICC and ANSI. The ICC relationship means that most of the 
provisions in the NAHB program will work together with other ICC 
building codes. This unique aspect provides a local government with 
the flexibility to incorporate all or part of the program into a local 
building code because, unlike LEED and Green Globes, the NAHB 
drafted the ICC 700 program with code-compliant language. 
Moreover, ANSI’s accreditation process mandates that the NAHB 
program will undergo regular reviews, which include opportunities 
for public comments.58 The NAHB’s ICC 700 program thus provides 
a strong residential green building rating system that offers 
jurisdictions a well-intentioned, consensus-developed, flexible, 
voluntary, and third-party verified certificate for promoting 
sustainable construction policies. 
Each of these rigorous third-party verification systems offer 
governmental policy decision makers the opportunity to implement a 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 AIA CINCINNATI, COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES GREEN BUILDING COUNSEL’S 
LEED FOR HOMES AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS NATIONAL GREEN 
BUILDING STANDARD 11 (2010), available at http://www.greenresourcecouncil.org 
/AIA%20Cinci%20NGBS%20LEED.pdf. 
58 See ICC 700 Nat’l Green Building Standard, supra note 50. 
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public-private relationship that promotes sustainable goals without the 
need to maintain the specialized knowledge, expertise, and care 
required in this quickly developing field. 
B. Government-Designed Programs 
In several instances, state and local governments have decided to 
create their own programs to determine whether a building qualifies 
for special treatment. Each of the following pieces of legislation was 
enacted in response to the unique circumstances in each jurisdiction, 
creating captive programs for their distinct environmental needs. 
1. Austin Energy Green Building 
In 1985, the City Council of Austin, Texas, started the Austin 
Energy Green Building program (AEGB), which pioneered the 
country’s first comprehensive rating system for evaluating the 
sustainability of buildings due to more stringent government 
requirements at the local level.59 In this groundbreaking initiative, the 
developers created a system that scored a building on a five star scale 
for its impact on the environment and community.60 The original 
program presented a novel approach that considered many complex 
and contributing features (e.g., climate, building and energy 
efficiency, water and materials, durability, health, and safety) for 
commercial, multifamily, and residential properties within the rating 
system.61 
Currently, the AEGB comprises three different programs: 
Commercial Green Building, Single-Family Green Building, and 
Multifamily Green Building.62 At the center of these programs is a 
computerized rating system that awards points for following 
sustainable practices; the points are verified by site visits.63 An AEGB 
 
59 Mary Tuma, Nation Follows Austin’s LEED, COMTY. IMPACT NEWSPAPER, Jan. 15, 
2010, available at http://www.impactnews.com/articles/nation-follows-austin%27s      -
leed (noting that the AEGB program rated its first building two years before the USGBC 
came into existence). AEGB became a charter member of the USGBC, hosted the 
inaugural convention for the fledgling organization, and allowed its staff to participate in 
the development and creation of the LEED program. Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See Building Professionals, AUSTIN ENERGY GREEN BLDG., https://my.austinenergy 
.com/wps/portal/aegb/aegb/programs (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
63 AUSTIN ENERGY GREEN BLDG., COMMERCIAL GUIDEBOOK V2010_02, 3, 4 (2010), 
available at http://my.austinenergy.com/wps/wcm/connect/3241bd0043363fddb3e4f3ac 
1623868e/aegbCommercialGuidebook.pdf.pdf?MOD=AJPERES, [hereinafter  
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representative will examine the site throughout the project and will 
visit, at a minimum, during early, middle, and final/completion stages 
of construction to ensure compliance.64 
Within the rating system, these programs also allow applicants to 
select between Performance or Prescriptive tracks for earning 
credits.65 If an applicant chooses the Prescriptive direction, then the 
program dictates a precise solution for receiving the point.66 In 
contrast, the Performance approach allows an applicant the latitude to 
select other methods to fulfill the requirement, but the applicant must 
also demonstrate equivalency to other sustainable practices in order to 
receive the credit.67 With this flexibility, the rating program assesses 
the building and awards it a star level based on the total points 
achieved.68 If a building meets the basic prerequisites, it receives one 
star.69 Additional stars awarded to a building signify an increase in the 
building’s green features.70 
Recently, the AEGB and NAHB programs decided to offer a dual 
certification for projects in central Texas so buildings can receive 
recognition by both organizations and avoid duplicative effort, 
inspections, and paperwork.71 By taking such an action, the AEGB 
looked to gain broader national attention for its pioneering program, 
while the NAHB sought to expand its understanding of how a 
program needs to adapt due to changing times and technology. 
 
COMMERCIAL GUIDEBOOK]; AUSTIN ENERGY GREEN BLDG., GUIDE TO THE SINGLE-
FAMILY HOME RATING VERSION 2010.1, 5, 6 (2010), available at https://my.austinenergy 
.com/wps/wcm/connect/b9a73300433640a6b40ef7ac1623868e/aegbSingleFamilyHome 
RatingGuide.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [hereinafter FAMILY HOME RATING GUIDE]; AUSTIN 
ENERGY GREEN BLDG., MULTIFAMILY GUIDEBOOK V2010_02, 2–6 (2010), available at 
https://my.austinenergy.com/wps/wcm/connect/dbb29e0043364031b3f1f3ac1623868e 
/aegbMultifamilyGuidebook.pdf.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [hereinafter MULTIFAMILY 
GUIDEBOOK]. 
64 See COMMERCIAL GUIDEBOOK, FAMILY HOME RATING GUIDE, & MULTIFAMILY 
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 64. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Press Release, City of Austin, Texas, Austin Energy Green Building to Offer Dual-
Certification with National Green Building Standard (Nov. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.austinenergy.com/About%20Us/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/Press%20 
Release%20Archive/2010/greenBuildingStandard.htm. 
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The AEGB program thus created a novel and rigorous approach to 
incorporating sustainable practices into the construction industry that 
ignited a movement many years later and inspired several other third-
party verification systems across the country. 
2. State of New York 
Originally conceived in 1995, the State of New York instituted the 
nation’s first tax-based incentive program for green buildings in 
2000.72 In taking this action, the drafters of the legislation tackled the 
thorny issue of determining qualifications for the tax credit.73 
However, due to a state law preventing the use of third-party 
benchmarks that may change over time and some issues associated 
with the fledgling LEED program, New York chose to prescribe its 
own requirements.74 
Under the Green Building Tax Credit (GBTC), the state directly 
stipulated requirements for compliance.75 While this strategy for 
achieving a green building differs from the alternative-based LEED 
program, it also maintains some similarities as well.76 
Beginning with the energy consumption component, the GBTC 
determines compliance based on the structure’s energy usage, 
whereas LEED uses material costs as a basis for its choices.77 
Moreover, the GBTC requires an indoor air quality plan prior to and 
during construction as well as in the operation and maintenance of the 
building following its commissioning, but a LEED rated building 
need not complete one in order to be deemed compliant.78 
In addition, the GBTC requires participants to keep track of the 
performance of buildings and tenants in the program.79 This 
recordkeeping covers performance reports for indoor air quality and 
energy.80 The documents that fall into these categories include 
findings from annual air monitoring evaluations together with 
 
72 See, e.g., CRAIG KNEELAND, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., NEW 
YORK STATE’S GREEN BUILDING TAX CREDIT 1 (2006), http://epa.gov/statelocalclimate 
/documents/pdf/4_20_06_Austin_GBTC_paper_Kneeland.pdf. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 5. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 5–6. 
78 Id. at 6. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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verification that smoking provisions were enforced and that those 
responsible resolved any requests to sort out any indoor air quality 
issues.81 Also, the monthly and initial performance results of 
photovoltaic and fuel cell technologies as well as the annual energy 
consumption for the building must be documented. But the 
regulations leave any comparisons between theoretical and actual 
performance to research projects.82 
While the New York compliance program for a green building sets 
forth its own requirements, it also maintains a few areas in 
conjunction with the LEED program. This occurs with the use of 
refrigerants and associated equipment.83 In these situations, the 
regulations turn to the LEED rating system’s language for 
compliance.84 Likewise, the enabling legislation also requires the 
GBTC to follow the LEED program in building materials, finishes, 
and furnishings.85 Ultimately, the GBTC program generally 
corresponds with the LEED requirements as long as they also include 
the Additional Commissioning Credit with Systems and an Energy 
Management manual and post-occupancy review.86 
Hence, the AEGB and GBTC pioneered the modern movement of 
assessing and evaluating green or high performance buildings in order 
to further more environmentally friendly policies while using 
financial incentives to motivate market participants to voluntarily 
support and promote sustainability across the construction industry. 
II 
GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES 
Because different buildings negatively impact the environment in 
different ways, the majority of those involved with climate change 
initiatives call for an international, or at the very least a national, 
approach when addressing issues like sustainable construction 
because of the large-scale nature of environmental degradation caused 
by development activities.87 Called the Matching Principle, this 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See Energy and Climate, NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/60.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
84 Id. 
85 See KNEELAND, supra note 72, at 5. 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 See Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private 
Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285, 296 (2010). 
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position is also supported by other theories like the Race to the 
Bottom, where higher tiered governments try to set broader 
environmental policy goals to prevent competition among lower level 
jurisdictions that set regulations with progressively lower compliance 
thresholds in order to attract development.88 However, the Matching 
Principle theory argues that most of the impacts from real estate 
development create local-level, negative environmental externalities 
(like stormwater runoff, construction debris, and negative air quality), 
bolstering the belief in marrying purely local environmental issues 
like land use with the appropriate level of government response.89 
Government programs that provide incentives for green and high 
performing buildings, as currently constituted, tend to fall into three 
distinct categories based on the programs’ tier level. At the federal 
level, the efforts tend to focus on government-constructed and 
government-occupied buildings without addressing a regulatory 
framework for the private sector. At the state level, a variety of 
different programs have been implemented to induce participation in 
green buildings from the private sector, but none compel compliance 
from nongovernmental developers. Finally, local governments appear 
to have taken the most detailed approach in their codes: they provide 
the main interface with private development projects located within 
their jurisdiction. Note that this last structure comports with the 
notion that the Matching Principle demands a more local-level 
approach to regulating the negative environmental impact of buildings 
and development. 
A. Federal 
The federal government’s programs focus on internal activities that 
reduce its environmental footprint.90 The recent approach for the 
federal government’s involvement with third-party standards begins 
with the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Congress instructed the National 
 
88 Id. at 301–03. 
89 Id. at 296–300. 
90 See KIBERT, supra note 10, at 48 (pointing out that one commentator explained that 
the 1993 “Greening of the White House” became one of the early undertakings to gain 
publicity regarding the federal government’s efforts towards sustainable construction 
projects). These efforts showed dramatic energy cost savings of around $300,000 per year, 
decreases in emissions of approximately 767 metric tons of carbon per year, and 
substantial reductions in the related costs for water and solid waste. Id. These 
achievements led to new efforts in other parts of the executive branch of the government 
like the U.S. Post Office, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the 
General Services Administration. Id. 
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Institute of Building Sciences to determine whether the currently 
applied benchmarks incorporated the latest technological standards.91 
Then, the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive (OFEE) 
conceived and brought Executive Order (EO) 13423 to President 
George W. Bush for his signature on January 24, 2007.92 This 
directive reinforced and provided instructions for all parts of the 
executive branch of government to adhere to the Federal Leadership 
in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings Memorandum of 
Understanding previously agreed upon by nineteen different agencies 
in January 2006.93 
Subsequently, Congress turned many parts of EO 13423 into law 
when it passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA).94 Through this legislation, Congress revised sections of the 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act and mandated energy 
management goals across the federal government.95 Moreover, the 
EISA instructed different organizations within the government like 
the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of 
Energy (DOE) to take action with regard to high performance and 
green buildings.96 
Most recently, President Barack Obama signed EO 13514, which 
includes additional goals and objectives applicable to high 
performance buildings for all parts of the executive branch of the 
government.97 Beyond the existing goals in EO 13423, EO 13514 
reiterates the necessity of achieving fifteen percent of an agency’s 
existing building inventory via sustainable practices. It also instructs 
the executive branch to make annual progress toward one-hundred 
percent conformance with the guiding principles established in the 
2006 Memorandum of Understanding.98 
As a result of all these actions, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the OFEE, and the Whole Building Design Guide of the 
 
91 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-058, 119 Stat. 594, § 914 (2005). 
92 Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,919 (Jan. 26, 2007). 
93 Id. 
94 GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., SUSTAINABILITY MATTERS 13 (2008), available at 
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/Sustainability_Matters_508.pdf. 
95 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 437, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1619–20 (2007). 
96 Id. 
97 Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009). 
98 Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,919 (Jan. 26, 2007); Exec. Order No. 13,514, 
74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,119 (2009). 
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National Institute of Building Sciences came to together to issue the 
Federal Green Construction Guide for Specifiers.99 In this document, 
the government created recommendations for internal use when 
listing specifications for a project to ensure compliance with all 
applicable high performance and green building directives.100 
The Federal Green Construction Guide for Specifiers turns to 
independent verification requirements with details encompassing 
directives from different parts of the government.101 The Specifier 
Note begins by explaining that after modification in 2002, OMB A-11 
now states, “Agencies are encouraged to incorporate Energy Star or 
LEED building standards into up-front design concepts for new 
construction and/or building renovations.”102 It further explains that 
since 2003, the GSA supports conformance with the USGBC’s LEED 
program and the availability of other systems.103 The note specifically 
mentions other programs like the Austin Green Building Program and 
Green Globes, while the guide contains language for these as well as 
the ASTM 2430 and ICC 700-2008 National Green Building 
Standards.104 
While the GSA promotes LEED as its main program for high 
performance or green buildings,105 the program is not an exclusive 
one for the federal government. Other departments within the 
executive branch, like the Department of Veterans Affairs, chose to 
use Green Globes as the standard for complying with the goals of EO 
13423 when building facilities across the country.106 
The goals of EO 13423 and EO 13514 have become the paramount 
guiding forces in changing the types of buildings that the federal 
government constructs. They also demonstrate that the third-party 
 
99 Federal Green Construction Guide for Specifiers, WHOLE BLDG. DESIGN GUIDE, 
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_org.php?o=84 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
100 See id. 
101 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE FED. ENVTL. EXEC., & WHOLE BLDG. 
DESIGN GUIDE, FEDERAL GREEN CONSTRUCTION GUIDE FOR SPECIFIERS, 01 10 00-3 
(2010). 
102 Id. OMB A-11 provides guidance to the executive branch of the government in 
completing the budget process. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Sustainable Design Program, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov 
/portal/category/21083 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
106 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Green Globe Certification 
Awarded to 15 VA Medical Centers (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www1.va.gov/opa/pressrel 
/pressrelease.cfm?id=1837. 
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verification requirement allows for flexibility in program selection 
given the diverse types of structures needed by the government. 
B. State 
At the state level, the only mandatory green building requirements 
are for public projects. However, several states choose to incentivize 
private developers through various strategies like tax incentives and 
priority permit processing in order to accomplish a broader 
environmental agenda.107 
In addition to the previously discussed New York program,108 
many other states have opted to attach their financial incentives to a 
preexisting third-party verification system rather than create their own 
standard. Oregon and Maryland became the first two states to take 
this approach in 2001.109 Under the Oregon Revised Statutes, the 
Director of the State Department of Energy adopts the rules and 
standards for performance in order to qualify for the tax credit.110 
Following this statutory directive, the State Department of Energy 
issued regulations that adopted the USGBC’s LEED program as the 
applicable standard to meet to receive the tax credit.111 On the other 
hand, the administrative rules also consider sustainable buildings that 
are “rated and certified by a program approved by the Department that 
provides comparable performance on environmental measures and 
equivalent or better energy performance as documented by whole 
building energy modeling, is commissioned and is verified by an 
independent third party.”112 
However, the next subsections give details for specific LEED 
requirements, which would probably need translation into another 
third-party program’s requirements should a party bring the issue 
forward.113 This language leaves open the door of opportunity for 
other third-party programs to gain acceptance by the agency. Thus, 
Oregon ties its program requirements strongly to LEED while 
allowing the possibility of other third-party systems to qualify as well. 
 
107 See generally Darren A. Prum, Creating State Incentives for Commercial Green 
Buildings: Did the Nevada Experience Set an Example or Alter the Approach of Other 
Jurisdictions?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 171 (2009). 
108 See supra Part I.B.2. 
109 See Prum, supra note 107, at 192–93. 
110 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469.185-225, 315.354, 315.356 (2011). 
111 OR. ADMIN. R. 330-090-0110(71) (2010). 
112 Id. at (71)(a). 
113 Id. at (71)(a)(A)–(B). 
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Maryland also created its own unique program somewhere in 
between the methods employed by New York and Oregon. 
Maryland’s approach uses tax credits combined with limitations for 
allowable costs combined with an annual aggregate amount over the 
program’s existence in a manner similar to the New York method.114 
However, like Oregon’s decision to employ an external standard, 
Maryland also chose to integrate the LEED Gold standard into its 
requirements.115 The Maryland Energy Administration (MEA) 
manages the program and determines the credit based on allowable 
costs but provides no additional incentives for projects attaining a 
level higher than Gold.116 This means that certification by the USGBC 
becomes unnecessary because a project only needs to meet the LEED 
standards according to the MEA.117 Consequently, the achievement of 
a LEED rating through the USGBC is only a guideline in Maryland 
because the MEA will ultimately determine compliance for the 
program it administrates. 
Following New York, Oregon, and Maryland, Nevada created its 
original incentive program in 2005 only to modify it in 2007. This 
was due to an overly generous set of benefits and misapplications by 
the agencies charged with implementation.118 The original legislation 
called for a project to meet or exceed the LEED Silver rating to 
qualify for the financial incentives.119 Upon issuing its first 
regulations for qualification, the Director of the Office of Energy 
adopted LEED Version 2 for existing buildings, operations, and 
maintenance as well as Version 2.1 and 2.2 for any new 
construction.120 Furthermore, the directive provided for the Nevada 
program to automatically update to the latest version put forward by 
the USGBC unless the Director took action to the contrary. 
However, when a new governor and appointed Director came into 
power, the Office of Energy adopted a new regulation that changed 
 
114 MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN., 10-722(k) (2009). 
115 MD. CODE REGS. 14.26.02.04 (2011). 
116 Id. 
117 Green Building Tax Credit: Overview, MD. ENERGY ADMIN., http://www.energy 
.state.md.us/Business/documents/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 
2012). 
118 See generally Prum, supra note 107. 
119 2005 22d Spec. Sess. Nev. Stat. 68, 69. 
120 See Adopted Regulation of the Director of the Office of Energy File No. R025-06, 
NEV. OFFICE OF ENERGY (June 28, 2006), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register 
/2006Register/R025-06A.pdf. 
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the fundamental approach and allowed credits from one building in a 
larger development to share credits with other structures in the same 
project in order qualify for the tax credit.121 This continued to make 
LEED the standard to achieve for the state’s financial incentives but 
made certification from the USGBC unnecessary.122 More 
importantly, this action coupled with the Nevada Tax Commission 
qualifying any project in existence prior to a specific date123 opened 
the floodgates for massive revenue shortfalls to the state and local 
governments because of the property tax abatement and sales tax 
reduction.124 
As a result, the Nevada Legislature revised its program in 2007 to 
only allow a less generous and more limited property tax 
abatement.125 This time the Office of Energy adopted new regulations 
that selected the LEED system as developed by the USGBC for 
Nevada and required the Director to review its applicability at least 
once a year.126 In order for the Director to adopt a newer version of 
the LEED program, the update must have been in existence for more 
than two years and cannot apply toward homes.127 Moreover, the 
financial incentive requires specific points for energy conservation 
with a greater benefit for higher levels of LEED achievement.128 
Hence, Nevada’s approach now solely relies on the LEED program 
and requires certification by the USGBC as well as the official 
documents explaining the different point totals used to attain a 
compliance level. 
After Nevada’s painful experience, and with an eye to avoiding 
similar situations, several other states also decided to stimulate green 
 
121 See NEV. OFFICE OF ENERGY ADOPTED REGULATION R170-06 § 1(6) (Mar. 23, 
2007). 
122 Id.; see also Neff, infra note 123 (demonstrating that many assailed this change by 
the Office of Energy as a move to assist gaming developers qualify for the state’s financial 
incentives while allowing smoking in the casinos); the LEED standard for “Indoor Air 
Quality” focuses on the health effects related to ventilation and airflow in conjunction with 
the sources for contamination like tobacco smoke. Christopher P. Perzan, Environmental 
Protection: What You Should Know About Green Building, CBA REC., Nov. 2006, at 39. 
123 See Erin Neff, Editorial, Carson City’s Own Green Monster, LAS VEGAS REV. J., 
May 20, 2007, http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/7598327.html. 
124 See Dan Musgrove, Encouraging Sustainable Development, N. NEV. BUS. WKLY., 
May 19, 2008, http://nnbw.com/ArticleRead.aspx?storyID-11110. 
125 Nev. Assemb. B. No. 621, 74th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nov. 2007). 
126 Adopted Regulation R116-07 (2007) (codified as amended at NEV. ADMIN. CODE    
§ 701A.010-§ 701A.290 (2008)). 
127 Id. § 701A.210. 
128 Id. 
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building construction with more precise programs.129 In the most 
unique approach to incentivizing developers, Hawaii directed all 
counties that issue building, construction, or development related 
permits to establish a mechanism for expedited processing when a 
project includes energy or environmental design standards.130 
In giving this 2006 directive to the counties, the Hawaii Legislature 
qualified projects that meet “the leadership in energy and 
environmental design [LEED] silver or two green globes rating 
system or another comparable state-approved, nationally recognized, 
and consensus-based guideline, standard, or system.”131 This language 
shows the Hawaii Legislature’s understanding that standards will 
evolve and provides its lower tiers of government flexibility to 
accomplish the larger policy goals. 
While this approach seems like it benefits all involved, one 
commentator pointed out some of its negative attributes.132 Carl Circo 
mentions that the governmental entity will need to maintain qualified 
personnel to comprehend and administer the program’s goals as well 
as provide a substantial enough benefit so as to encourage 
participation.133 Moreover, some complex projects will require the 
involvement of multiple governmental agencies.134 Some of these 
agencies may not participate in the expediting process, so the cost 
savings in terms of speed may not be enough to encourage 
participation.135 When considering the size of the local governments 
within the state and the need for sustainable practices in the island 
setting, Hawaii achieves environmental gains in the short and long 
terms while putting forward a flexible requirement for the verification 
of its goals. 
In 2007, New Mexico enacted legislation that created the 
“Sustainable Building Tax Credit” and placed the Energy, Minerals, 
 
129 Mins Assemb. Comm. On Commerce & Labor: Hearing on A.B. 621 Before the 
Assemb. Comm. On Commerce & Labor, 2007 Leg., 74th Sess. 10 (Nev. 2007), available 
at www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Minutes/Assembly/CMC/Final/1387.pdf (statement of Pamela 
Vilkin, President, Las Vegas Regional Chapter, United States Green Building Council). 
130 HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-19.6 (2011). 
131 Id. § 46-19.6(b). 
132 See Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance Buildings 
Pay Impact or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive Programs and Other 
Sustainable Development Initiatives?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 64–
65 (2009). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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and Natural Resources Department in charge of its administration.136 
Like New York and Maryland, New Mexico also placed financial 
limitations on its program.137 For a project to be eligible, it must 
receive a LEED Silver or higher-level certification from the 
USGBC.138 As part of the submission package, the agency requires a 
copy of the LEED certificate from the USGBC.139 This means that 
participation in the LEED program provides the only method for 
obtaining New Mexico’s tax credit incentive. Correspondingly, the 
New Mexico approach exclusively relies on LEED to provide 
compliance validation with its program. 
Finally, Virginia decided to create a separate class of real property 
for energy efficient buildings in an approach very similar to 
Nevada’s.140 The 2008 legislation looked to incentivize energy 
efficient buildings by allowing the local governments the option to 
levy equal or lesser property taxes that obtained this new 
classification.141 The benchmark for determining an energy efficient 
building requires the performance in the new structure to exceed the 
Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code by over thirty percent 
through the use of a third-party verification system.142 To assist in 
making this determination, the Virginia statute allows many different 
programs like LEED, Energy Star (from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency), Green Globes (from the Green Building 
Initiative), or the EarthCraft House Program.143 Accordingly, the 
Virginia program appears to cast a wide net in allowing participation 
from many different third-party verification standards. 
The various state programs show a variety of different strategies 
with respect to third-party verification standards. Almost all of the 
state programs mention LEED in some manner. Many states predicate 
their incentive programs on compliance with the USGBC’s LEED 
system either directly or through its own administrative review 
 
136 2007 N.M. Laws 2714, 2734–35 (2007). 
137 Id. 
138 N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 3.4.17.11, 13 (note that the state does provide an alternative 
method for satisfying the energy reduction requirement outside of the LEED Program). 
This remedy is limited to situations where the building type occurs outside the normal 
scope of the modeling programs. Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See H.B. 239, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008) (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 58.1-3221.2 (2009)). 
141 VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.2 (2009). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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process. This generally appears as the default option in many 
jurisdictions; however, the enabling directives often allow other third-
party verification programs as possible alternatives should a project 
owner wish to forge new ground within the agency providing the 
administration. Furthermore, this ability to qualify through programs 
other than LEED shows how the authors of the legislation or 
regulations understand the evolving nature of sustainable construction 
projects. In some jurisdictions, the environmental demands can 
change drastically and some third-party programs may not cover all 
situations or all types of structures. This built-in flexibility 
demonstrates the complexity of these types of incentives when 
applied to practice. 
Therefore, the best approaches by states to incentivize sustainable 
construction appear to require adherence and certification by a third-
party standard in such a manner that the administrative agencies can 
accept different programs but cannot deviate within one for political 
gain. 
C. Local 
As the tier of government that deals most directly with developers, 
local governments create and terminate a wide variety of programs to 
encourage their policy objectives. Due to the numerous locales trying 
to promote sustainable development through policy goals, our 
approach for evaluating the choices by local governmental entities in 
selecting third-party verification systems will focus more on the types 
of incentives offered, with an examination of the more prominent 
jurisdictional choices rather than the differences between and within 
the many locations. With this in mind, we separated the programs on 
the basis of whether the government provides financial or 
nonfinancial incentives, with the exclusion of technical and marketing 
assistance, since they generally will not provide an exclusive type of 
encouragement. 
1. Nonfinancial Incentives 
An incentive that provides something of value to a developer will 
sometimes create more of an inducement than the use of a financial 
offering. Depending on the jurisdiction, the length of time to receive 
approval for a project differs; in some locations, this may take 
prolonged periods of time, which causes delays and increased costs to 
a developer. By offering expedited reviews as an inducement in order 
to promote green building, a jurisdiction may encourage sustainable 
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practices without giving direct financial incentives to developers of 
green buildings.144 
While the legislature in Hawaii directed its local governments to 
provide expedited reviews for projects including energy and 
environmental design standards, many municipalities took this action 
on their own accord.145 The jurisdictions that follow this approach do 
so by either offering a priority building permit process or expediting 
the development plan review.146 In this type of program, the 
jurisdiction creates screening criteria that enable the applicable 
government agency to process the project in a faster manner.147 
Similarly, but with a different fundamental approach, other 
jurisdictions manifest preferences for those plans that exhibit certain 
sustainable development characteristics and allow the overseeing 
agency to administrate the submissions quicker.148 However, as 
explained earlier,149 this type of approach also faces a number of 
challenges that need resolution in order to provide an effective 
incentive. As such, this type of incentive may prove difficult to 
implement, but if done correctly, it can provide a cost-effective 
incentive that will further the local government’s policy goals. 
In a different nonfinancial approach, other jurisdictions choose to 
offer density bonuses for those developers who voluntarily adhere to a 
sustainable construction program. One observer has noted that many 
jurisdictions like to use this approach because it has relatively no 
costs for everyone involved.150 Moreover, local governments will 
often set public policy priorities in their zoning based on densities or 
height, so a relaxation of those requirements when a developer 
provides a host of other environmentally friendly benefits as a trade-
 
144 See BROOKS RAINWATER, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, LOCAL LEADERS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY: A STUDY OF GREEN BLDG. PROGRAMS IN OUR NATION’S CMTYS. 18 
(2008), available at http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aias075288 
.pdf. 
145 See YUDELSON ASSOCS., THE NAT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. & OFFICE PROPS. RESEARCH 
FOUND., GREEN BUILDING INCENTIVES THAT WORK: A LOOK AT HOW LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS ARE INCENTIVIZING GREEN DEVELOPMENT 23 (2007), available at 
http://www.naiop.org/foundation/greenincentives.pdf. 
146 Id. at 27. 
147 See id.; see also U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, Green Building Incentive Strategies, 
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=2078#exp (last visited Apr. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Incentive Strategies]. 
148 Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
149 See supra Part II.B. 
150 See Circo, supra note 132, at 67. 
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off makes sense on both sides.151 As a result, this method provides the 
developer a possibility of extra income through rental or sales of the 
additional units while encouraging private parties to assist in 
accomplishing the local government’s policy goals.152 
A closer look at the different jurisdictions’ program requirements 
reveals that the governments that provide an expedited permit process 
tend to have one feature in common. All require LEED certification 
exclusively or in conjunction with a local program like the Green 
Built North Texas, Built Green in Washington, or the Florida Green 
Building Coalition’s Green Home Designation Standard.153 
Furthermore, in examining the representative governments that allow 
density bonuses, these jurisdictions also chose to solely require LEED 
compliance without including any other programs.154 
Thus, the two types of nonfinancial incentives offered by the 
various local governments to promote sustainable development 
projects lack even token flexibility compared to the various programs 
available across the country. Local governments fail to allow 
developers to select a verifiable alternative based on a project’s 
unique characteristics. 
2. Financial Incentives 
Frequently, there needs to be a financial incentive in order to gain 
voluntary support by private industry for a policy and its associated 
goals. In the real estate industry, the main consideration for most 
participants is profit. Because the costs to achieve a certification level 
may not make financial sense to developers, many governmental 
leaders turn to financial incentives in order to advance the 
jurisdiction’s environmental policy goals. As such, the four main 
strategies include reducing fees associated with construction, tax 
credits and abatements, sustainability grants, and revolving loans. 
 
151 See RAINWATER, supra note 144, at 19. 
152 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
153 See, e.g., City of Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 27131 (Apr. 9, 2008); City of Gainesville, 
Fla., Ordinance 001835 (Oct. 14, 2002); County of Hillsborough, Fla., Dev. Rev. Proc. 
Man. § 4.1.5.1.2 (adopted Oct. 9, 2007); City of Issaquah, Wash., Resolution 2004-11 
Attch. A § (4)(B)(iv) (Dec. 21, 2004); City of Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 179820 (Apr. 
22, 2008); SANTA MONICA, Cal., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.108.050 (2010); County of 
Sarasota, Fla., Resolution R2006-174 (Aug. 22, 2006). 
154 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
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One of the low-cost approaches endorsed by many jurisdictions 
involves reducing fees owed by the developer to the government.155 In 
these types of situations, the applicable jurisdiction may charge a 
litany of fees for the various necessary permits or processing of the 
project through the agency reviews.156 When a project meets certain 
green building or high performance conditions, either before, during, 
or after construction, the agency collecting the fees either reduces the 
applicable charges or returns them at the appropriate time.157 
One commentator cautions that the reductions in fees will also 
decrease government revenue.158 Accordingly, this incentive and the 
associated decrease in revenue must correspond with an increase in 
revenue or expenditure cuts somewhere else in the agency’s budget.159 
This action, called “cost shifting,” may create opportunities for legal 
challenges where a developer believes the fees for not building green 
or high performance become excessive to compensate for the green 
building agenda.160 
In addition, some jurisdictions offer revolving loans to projects that 
meet certain green or high performance criteria. In these programs, 
the jurisdiction looks to overcome some of the increased expenses 
associated with attaining a green or high performance standard.161 
 
155 See Circo, supra note 132, at 66. 
156 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
157 See, e.g., Arlington County, Va., County Board Agenda Item Meeting of March 14, 
2009 (demonstrating that Arlington County, Virginia, projects pay a fee ($0.045 per square 
foot of gross floor area) to supply the county’s green building fund for educational 
purposes, and developers that attain LEED certification become eligible for a refund of 
that fee); Green Building Density Incentive Policy for Site Plan Projects 2 (Feb. 27, 2009); 
Babylon, N.Y., Code ch. 89, art. VIII, § 89-96 (2006) (offers a rebate for projects that 
achieve LEED certification); Burbank, Cal., Municipal Code tit. 9, ch.1, art. 10 § 10-1008 
(effective Dec. 21, 2007) (provides a reduced permit and plan review fee for participants 
in the Green Building and Sustainable Architecture Program); Livermore, Cal., Municipal 
Code tit. 15, ch. 15.76, § 15.76.070 (2009) (reduces the applicable fees when LEED or 
GreenPoint standards are met); Eagle County, Colo., Land Use Regulations art. 4, §§ 4-
820, 4-920 (2008) (establishes building permit rebates based on the achievement of 
“ECOBuild” points); Borough of Doylestown, Pa., Ordinance 2008-8 (Apr. 21, 2008) 
(reduces permit fees based on attaining the Green Points program and meeting LEED 
requirements). Other jurisdictions that take this same approach consist of: the City of 
Sacramento as well as San Diego and Santa Barbara Counties, California; the City of 
Gainesville and Sarasota County, Florida; Mecklenberg County, North Carolina; the City 
of San Antonio, Texas. See YUDELSON ASSOCS., supra note 145, at 28, 29; see Incentive 
Strategies, supra note 147. 
158 See Circo, supra note 132, at 66–67. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
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These loans offer a subsidized interest rate based on and below the 
financial gains realized through the operational side of the building.162 
This enables the fund and building owner to share financially in each 
month’s performance benefits over a traditional structure.163 As a 
result, the fund is regularly replenished from successful endeavors 
and can fund new loans, while the building owner eliminates the 
additional financial burdens associated with the higher level of 
construction.164 
Many local governments utilize the more financially aggressive 
system of tax credits and abatements discussed previously to promote 
green buildings in their jurisdictions.165 In using this strategy, the 
local government immediately loses revenue with the expectation that 
a high performance or green building will increase in value over the 
long term and allow for higher assessments in the future.166 
Depending on how the incentive is structured, a tax credit works by 
reducing an existing tax liability, while abatements exempt taxpayers 
from a given responsibility for a set duration of time.167 
Furthermore, some jurisdictions provide grants as a method to 
encourage reluctant developers to choose a green or high performance 
alternative. In this type of approach, the local government awards 
developers money toward specific green or high performance 
outcomes.168 This type of program tries to offset the above normal 
costs associated with the design and construction of sustainable 
developments.169 
 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.; see YUDELSON ASSOCS., supra note 145, at 25–28. (describing how the 
following jurisdictions embrace this type of program: Phoenix, Arizona; the Cities of 
Alameda and Berkeley as well as Sonoma County, California; Babylon, New York; and 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin). 
165 See supra Part II.B. 
166 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
167 Id.; see YUDELSON ASSOCS., supra note 145, at 28 (demonstrating that some 
representative jurisdictions of this approach include Pasadena, California; Chatham 
County, Georgia; Honolulu, Hawaii; Baltimore and Howard County, Maryland; 
Cincinnati, Ohio; and Harris County, Texas). 
168 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147; see also YUDELSON ASSOCS., supra note 
145, at 29 (some of the jurisdictions that take this approach comprise: Alameda County 
and the Cities of Los Angeles, Pasadena, and Santa Monica, California; Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Portland, Oregon; El Paso, Texas; and King County and the City of Seattle, Washington). 
169 See Incentive Strategies, supra note 147. 
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Tax incentives and grants offer tremendous potential for achieving 
many of the desired local government policy goals.170 Even though 
the programs will create political controversy, tax incentives and 
grants will “revolutionize industry practices and . . . bring about a 
level of investment in green building design and construction 
practices that will assure true sustainability in the generational and 
global sense promoted by the international sustainability 
movement.”171 
An examination of the various local financial incentive programs 
reveals that most governments turn to LEED exclusively for their 
third-party verification, with the exception of the revolving loan 
programs. Just like the nonfinancial incentives, tax credits, fee 
reductions, and grants almost exclusively across all the 
representational jurisdictions stipulate LEED without even a 
consideration for the other programs.172 The only notable exceptions 
occur in the now ended program in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina, where the government allowed Green Globes, the NAHB 
program, and EarthCraft homes as well as the Florida jurisdictions 
that currently provide for the Florida Green Building Coalition’s 
Green Home Designation Standard.173 
In contrast, the revolving loan programs tend to encompass green 
or high performance building as part of a larger policy goal. These 
 
170 See Circo, supra note 132, at 71, 72. 
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., BABYLON, N.Y., CODE ch. 89, art. VIII, § 89-96 (2006); BALITMORE, 
MD., ORD. 78-07 (Oct. 15, 2007); Minutes of the Reg. Meeting of the Bd. of Comm’r of 
Chatham County, (May 12, 2006) (Chatham County, Ga.); CINCINNATI, OH., ORD. 446-
2007 (Dec. 12, 2007); EL PASO, TEX., ORDINANCE No. 28908 (June 10, 2008); Guidelines 
& Criteria for Granting Tax Abatement in a Reinvestment Zone Created in Harris County 
(May 20, 2008) (Harris County, Tex.); GAINESVILLE, FLA., ORD. 001,835 (Oct. 14, 2002); 
HILLSBOROUGH, FLA., DEV. REV. PROC. MANUAL. § 4.1.5.1.2 (Adopted Oct. 9, 2007); 
HONOLULU, HAW., B. 69 (2004); HOWARD, MD., B. 49-2007 (2007); PASADENA, CAL. 
MUN. CODE ch. 14.90 (2010); LOS ANGELES, CAL., ORD. 179,820 (Apr. 22, 2008); SANTA 
MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.108.050 (2010); SARASOTA, FLA., RESOL. R2006-174 
(Aug. 22, 2006). 
173 See Mecklenberg, N.C., Action Item 22 (Dec. 18, 2007); GAINESVILLE, FLA., ORD. 
001835 (Oct. 14, 2002); HILLSBOROUGH, FLA., DEV. REV. PROC. MANUAL § 4.1.5.1.2 
(Oct. 9, 2007); SARASOTA, FLA., RESOL. R2006-174 (Aug. 22, 2006). Interestingly, the 
Mecklenberg County Board of Commissioners terminated the program on April 20, 2010, 
after noting that economic pressures slowed construction projects and caused a shortfall in 
the code enforcement budget while leaving a balance of $800,000 available for green 
building rebates. Mecklenberg, N.C., Action Item 15 (Apr. 20, 2010). Thus, the 
government swept into the general code enforcement budget the monies set aside to 
encourage green or high performance buildings. Id. 
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programs often focus on energy efficiency as the main objective, but 
they also recognize how a green or high performance building will 
further the goals of a larger project.174 As such, the revolving loan 
programs tend to qualify projects based on criteria other than a 
specific green or high performance building program.175 
The main types of financial incentives used by local governments 
to encourage green or high performance buildings provide little or no 
flexibility with regard to program choices. Both the nonfinancial and 
financial programs tend to favor almost exclusively the LEED 
program within the municipal and county jurisdictions while failing to 
provide options either administratively or otherwise for alternative 
and competing third-party verification systems that approach the goal 
with a different formula for compliance. 
Therefore, a private party wishing to develop a green or high 
performance building must generally turn to the LEED program for 
verification and compliance or risk not qualifying for any of the 
incentive programs offered by the state or local jurisdictions. 
III 
ANTITRUST LEGISLATION 
Given the booming market for green building materials and 
products fueled, in part, by regulatory requirements, it is conceivable 
that antitrust issues could arise in the future among competing, 
privately owned, environmental standard-setting organizations. This 
may occur when these organizations promote their respective systems 
to state and local governmental officials in an effort to convince them 
to incorporate their particular standards into building codes and other 
legislation, as well as when they advise and assess governments on 
green building initiatives. In the end, however, only one organization, 
such as the USGBC or Green Building Initiative,176 may successfully 
insert its rating system into the legislation, thus creating the specter of 
illegal monopolization or other illegal antitrust practices occurring 
between the winning third party and the government that selected it. 
Already, a representative of the Green Building Initiative has 
questioned the widespread permeation of LEED into state and local 
 
174 See generally Prum, supra note 107. 
175 Id. 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 6–30. 
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legislation from the perspective of unfair competition.177 Accordingly, 
these antitrust legal concerns have the potential for sustained growth 
as state and local governments continue to enact green building 
legislation at a rapid pace. Moreover, some literature has already 
suggested that a local government’s adoption of a particular green 
building rating system into legislation may effectively exclude certain 
products endorsed by that system from the local marketplace.178 This 
development may further the perception of unfair and collusive 
practices, particularly if those organizations engage in political or 
lobbying activity in support of their specific rating system.179 The 
following part of this Article examines the relevant antitrust laws and 
case law that may play a role in the future legal environment between 
local governments and third-party environmental standard-setting 
organizations such as the USGBC or the Green Building Initiative. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed in 1890, provides that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”180 Initially, the Sherman Act 
did not apply to the economic activities of state and local 
governments because the Commerce Clause was at that time 
interpreted narrowly. However, in 1937, the Commerce Clause was 
greatly expanded to encompass all activities that affected interstate 
commerce, as articulated in the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Co.181 
 
177 See Stephen Del Percio, Revisiting Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust 
Implications of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations for Policymakers, 
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 239 at 245 n.37 (2009) (quoting GBI official 
discussing Boston legislation incorporating LEED and stating that “there is clear legal 
precedent that prohibits the government from crafting a law to mandate one business or 
organization over another” and that although “GBI ‘doesn’t disagree at the core’ with laws 
mandating LEED,” it “just feels it’s not the right way to go”). 
178 See, e.g., id. (noting that the LEED system, as presently drafted, including under the 
LEED Version 3.0 rating system, will only award points under its Materials & Resources 
credit category for wood products that are certified by the Forest Stewardship Council, 
which has caused a major controversy across the North American timber community). The 
Supreme Court has called organizations similar to USGBC “traditional objects of antitrust 
scrutiny.” Id. at 242. See also infra text accompanying notes 226–29; Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509–11 (1988). 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 177–79. 
180 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010); see also id. § 2 (2010) (“[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . .”). 
181 See generally 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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Several years later, the Supreme Court ruled in Parker v. Brown 
that certain actions of a state government were immune from the 
Sherman Act.182 The holding in Parker, which related to California’s 
attempts to control raisin prices, came to be known as the state-action 
immunity or Parker Doctrine.183 With respect to local governments, 
however, the legal environment remained uncertain. This changed in 
1978 when the Court imposed a more restrictive standard in City of 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.184 In that case, a group of 
private utilities counterclaimed against the City of Lafayette and other 
municipalities in south Louisiana.185 The utilities asserted that these 
local governments were monopolizing in violation of the Sherman 
Act by restricting the utilities’ attempts to compete in these 
markets.186 The Court ruled against the city and municipalities, citing 
a mistrust of local governments when handling economic issues.187 
The Court voiced concern that they might commit acts that could 
hinder the broader national interest of promoting interstate 
commerce.188 To allay this fear, the Court held that, for a local 
government to be immune from antitrust scrutiny a state must 
delegate authority to engage in a particular activity.189 
 
182 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (emphasizing that the Sherman Act’s text and legislative 
history only applied to the actions of “business combinations”). 
183 See Hillary Greene, Articulating Trade-Offs: The Political Economy Of State Action 
Immunity, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 827, 828 (2006). (“State action immunity is a judicially 
created doctrine originating in the Supreme Court's ruling in Parker v. Brown (Parker). 
Parker broadly articulated the need to subordinate national competition policy, as 
embodied in the Sherman Act, to a state's right to assert regulatory autonomy in areas that 
the federal government had not preempted through antitrust or otherwise. The principle 
animating Parker was and remains clear: federalism.”). 
184 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal 
Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (rearticulating and further strengthening the rule laid 
out in City of Lafayette). 
185 City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392. 
186 Id. at 392 n.5. 
187 Id. at 408 (“If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely 
by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a 
serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the 
comprehensive national policy Congress established.”). 
188 Id. at 403 (a plurality stating that municipalities were no “more likely to comport 
with the broader interests of national economic well-being than are those of private 
corporations”). 
189 Id. at 415. The state-action immunity doctrine requires that municipalities act 
pursuant to “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy that 
authorizes” their actions. Id. at 410. 
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Despite City of Lafayette, several more Supreme Court cases,190 
and a federal statute,191 the status of local government immunity from 
antitrust law still remained unclear. In 1991, however, in the pivotal 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,192 the Court 
provided a clearer legal environment for local governments and 
private businesses, but one still rife with controversy. 
A. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Omni), the 
city government of Columbia, South Carolina, was sued for alleged 
antitrust violations over its preferential dealings with Columbia 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (COA).193 COA controlled over ninety-five 
percent of the billboard market in the city.194 Moreover, the 
company’s influence in the community was widespread.195 Company 
officers were heavily involved in local politics, contributing funds and 
free billboard space to city officials campaigning for office.196 The 
majority owner was also reputed to be friends with the mayor and city 
council members.197 When Omni attempted to gain a foothold in the 
Columbia billboard market, COA sought the assistance of city 
officials to pass zoning ordinances prohibiting new billboard 
 
190 See Cmty. Comm. Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982) (ruling that a 
local ordinance restricting competition must respond to a “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed” state public policy to be immune from antitrust liability); Town 
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985) (limiting the stricter rule in City of 
Boulder by stating the state law must clearly contemplate the anticompetitive effect rather 
than be affirmatively expressed). See generally Brent S. Kinkade, Note, Municipal 
Antitrust Immunity after City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 
1344, 67 WASH. L. REV. 479, 486 (1992). 
191 15 U.S.C. §§ 34–36 (1991). This statute mainly eliminated treble damages against 
local governments, but did not provide total immunity. See Kinkade, supra note 190, at 
481. 
192 See generally 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
193 Id. at 365. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 367 (“The mayor and other members of the city’s council were personal 
friends of COA’s majority owner, and the owner, and the company and its officers 
occasionally contributed funds and free billboard space to their campaigns.” Id. See also 
Case Comment, Antitrust Immunity: City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
105 HARV. L. REV. 360 (1991)). 
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construction. A state court, however, quashed the ordinance.198 In 
response, the city passed a new ordinance restricting the billboards’ 
size, location, and spacing.199 Although the newer ordinance was 
different, it essentially created the same anticompetitive effect as the 
first one.200 This time, however, Omni initiated a suit against the City 
of Columbia in federal court alleging violations of both sections one 
and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act201 and contending that the city 
did not possess immunity under Parker.202 Omni also asserted that the 
“sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a corollary to 
Parker203 that was first developed in Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,204 applied to COA’s 
activities with the city. 
The Court applied a two-prong test requiring (1) that the state has 
legal authority to implement the laws and (2) foreseeability that the 
activities in question will be anticompetitive.205 Once these elements 
are satisfied, a company’s actions would fall under the protection of 
Parker. With respect to the parties in Omni, this meant the city must 
possess “unquestioned zoning power over the size, location, and 
spacing of billboards,”206 a routine and common right the states 
bestow upon their local governments. The Court further stated that 
authority must be “clearly articulated.”207 However, this prong can be 
satisfied when “suppression of competition is the ‘foreseeable result’ 
 
198 Omni, 499 U.S. at 368. (describing how the state court “invalidated this ordinance 
on the ground that its conferral of unconstrained discretion upon the city council violated 
both the South Carolina and Federal Constitutions”). 
199 Id. at 368. 
200 Kinkade, supra note 190, at 361. 
201 Omni, 499 U.S. at 369. 
202 Id. (“Omni contended, in particular, that the city’s billboard ordinances were the 
result of an anticompetitive conspiracy between city officials and COA that stripped both 
parties of any immunity they might otherwise enjoy from the federal antitrust laws.”). 
203 Id. at 383 (explaining that “Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the 
principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; the former decision protects 
the States' acts of governing, and the latter the citizens' participation in government”; see 
E. R.R. Pres. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). See also 
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (extending Noerr 
immunity from antitrust law to petitioning activities by a labor union aimed at influencing 
federal government decisions). 
204 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see Del Percio, supra note 177 (note that Noerr immunity 
would likely protect an organization such as USGBC from lobbying a local government to 
insert its rating system into local legislation). 
205 Omni, 499 U.S. at 373. 
206 Id. at 372. 
207 Id. at 390. 
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of what the statute authorizes,” the test’s second prong.208 In Omni, 
the Court found that the zoning laws in question were both authorized 
and were not only foreseeable as a means of suppressing competition 
among competing land uses but were in fact created for that expressed 
purpose.209 
The Court also rejected the argument that certain exceptions should 
apply to the actions of the City of Columbia. The Court directly 
denied that a conspiracy exception existed in Parker. Indeed, in 
strongly worded language the Court argued that no exceptions exist 
because “it is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often 
agree to do what one or another group of private citizens urges upon 
them.”210 The Court also contended that allowing even inquiries into 
whether illegal conspiracies occurred “would require the sort of 
deconstruction of the governmental process and probing of the 
official ‘intent’ that we have consistently sought to avoid.”211 
Lastly, the Court rejected the argument that the city’s actions fell 
within the so-called sham exception created in the Noerr-Pennington 
cases.212 The Court repeated that the general rule, as first articulated 
in the Pennington case, is that “[f]ederal antitrust laws . . . do not 
regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive 
action from the government.”213 Even so, the Omni Court recognized 
that there is, under Noerr, a sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
 
208 Id. at 373 (quoting Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41–42 (1985)). 
209 Id. (“That condition is amply met here. The very purpose of zoning regulation is to 
displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of 
preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on the part of new entrants. A 
municipal ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of billboards (surely a 
common form of zoning) necessarily protects existing billboards against some competition 
from newcomers.”). 
210 Id. at 377 (justifying such activities by local governments by stating “[t]he fact is 
that virtually all regulation benefits some segments of the society and harms others; and 
that it is not universally considered contrary to the public good if the net economic loss to 
the losers exceeds the net economic gain to the winners”). 
211 Id. at 377–78 (stating that even bribes would not be actionable under Parker, but 
that other federal laws, citing as an example, the Hobbs Act, that might provide a remedy 
for such actions). 
212 See supra text accompanying note 203. 
213 Omni, 499 U.S. at 379–80 (quoting E. R.R. Pres. Conference, 365 U.S. at 141) 
(stating further that “this doctrine, like Parker, rests ultimately upon a recognition that the 
antitrust laws, ‘tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for 
application in the political arena”); MCI Comm., Corp. v. Am. Tele. & Tele. Co., 708 F.2d 
1081, 1153 (7th Cir. 1983) (justifying Noerr-Pennington protection through “the need to 
construe the antitrust laws in such a way as to avoid a conflict with the right to petition the 
government protected under the First Amendment”). 
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doctrine.214 The sham exception, the Court explained, “encompasses 
situations in which persons use the governmental processs—as 
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive 
weapon.”215 A classic example, it noted, “is the filing of frivolous 
objections to the license application of a competitor, with no 
expectation of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to 
impose expense and delay.”216 Thus, even a defendant company that 
“genuinely seeks to achieve [its] governmental result, but does so 
through improper means” is still protected from antitrust law.217 In 
applying this line of reasoning to Omni, the Court maintained that 
although COA was attempting to eliminate competition to its 
billboard business in Columbia, “it sought to do so not through the 
very process of lobbying, or of causing the city council to consider 
zoning measures, but rather through the ultimate product of that 
lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning ordinances.”218 Stated 
differently, the means are always proper as long as the scrutinized 
activity is meant to accomplish legitimate ends.219 
The Court also rejected the argument, relied upon by the Court of 
Appeals, “that COA’s purposes were to delay Omni’s entry into the 
market and even to deny it a meaningful access to the appropriate city 
administrative and legislative fora.”220 This, it was argued, occurred 
when COA engaged in aggressive lobbying with the city government 
and its officials. Lobbying and similar activity, the Court repeated, is 
not a sham “unless the delay is sought to be achieved only by the 
lobbying process itself, and not by the governmental action that the 
lobbying seeks.”221 
 
214 Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 (quoting E. R.R. Pres. Conference, 365 U.S. at 141) (“There 
may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing 
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the 
application of the Sherman Act . . .”). 
215 Id. at 380. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. (quoting Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d 458, 465, n.5 
(C.A.9 1987). See also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Developments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 
ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 362 (1987). 
218 Omni, 499 U.S. at 381. 
219 See supra text accompanying note 162. 
220 Omni, 499 U.S. at 381 (quoting Omni Outdoor Advert., Co. v. Columbia Outdoor 
Advert., Co., 891 F.2d 1127, 1139 (1989)). 
221 Id. (finding that the facts in the case did not suggest that such a sham existed). 
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in Omni significantly clarified the 
issue of antitrust laws’ applicability to local governments. This 
occurred despite the appearance of possibly unethical practices by 
Columbia’s elected city officials. Thus, the Court generally left the 
states and their municipalities alone to engage in business with the 
private sector as they saw fit, even if it might result in private sector 
actors egregiously violating antitrust law. 222 
B. Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of East Hills 
In the more recent case of Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. Village of 
East Hills, the Second Circuit applied the state action immunity 
doctrine in a factual posture that is instructive for state and local 
governments considering the adoption of a green building program 
that includes a privately developed third-party rating system. 223 
In Electrical Inspectors, a Long Island village adopted state-
mandated legislation requiring building owners to obtain certificates 
of occupancy from the village upon completion of an electrical 
inspection performed by a nonprofit inspection agency.224 The 
plaintiff, as a for-profit electrical company, alleged that it was 
effectively excluded from the market for local electrical inspection 
services.225 
The Second Circuit applied the two-pronged Parker test and 
determined that the municipality’s conduct had, in fact, satisfied the 
Parker inquiry.226 However, it remanded the case to the district court 
 
222 Id. at 372 (stating that interfering with the activities of state as well as local 
governments would undermine “the very interests of federalism [that Parker was] designed 
to protect”). 
223 See generally 320 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2002). 
224 Id. at 114 (“The defendant Village of Islandia (the ‘Village’) is a municipality 
located on New York’s Long Island. In 1988, the Village adopted a policy of requiring 
building owners to obtain certificates of occupancy from the Village, and conditioning the 
issuance of such certificates on the positive results of an electrical wiring inspection 
conducted by the not-for-profit defendant New York Board of Fire Underwriters (the 
‘Board’). Any property owner who wishes to use or occupy a building is required to 
submit to and pay the Board for the Board’s inspection.”). 
225 Id. (“The plaintiff, a for-profit corporation that also provides electrical inspection 
services in the State of New York, brought suit against both the Village and the Board in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that this 
arrangement resulted in violations of the Sherman Act and other federal and state laws.”). 
226 Id. (“We agree with the district court that for purposes of the state-action immunity 
doctrine, [compliance with the two-prong test] the state authorized the Village to pass the 
ordinance that gave the Board exclusivity with respect to the performance of wiring 
inspections in Islandia.”). 
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to determine whether the village was actively supervising the 
inspection services.227 
The Electrical Inspectors decision is noteworthy in the context of 
green building policy because a private, third-party environmental 
standard-setting organization may now be considered a private actor 
for purposes of the state action immunity doctrine. Thus, any 
government that includes a green building rating system within 
legislation should actively strive to supervise the administration of 
that rating system in order to avoid any allegations of anticompetitive 
effect. 
C. Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head, Inc. 
As presented in the foregoing discussion, both the Omni and 
Noerr-Pennington cases laid out the basic rules applicable to antitrust 
immunity for private companies, including private third-party 
providers of green building rating systems who are competing to gain 
business relationships with local governments. The 1988 Supreme 
Court decision in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 
clarified these decisions regarding antitrust immunity, albeit from a 
slightly different factual posture.228 In Allied Tube, plaintiff Indian 
Head, Inc., a producer of polyvinyl chloride (plastic) conduits, sued 
Allied Tube and other manufacturers for violating section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.229 Allied Tube was the largest producer of steel conduit 
in the country and, together with several other steel conduit 
manufacturers, used its membership in the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) to keep Indian Head from having its product 
listed on the National Electric Code.230 Allied and other steel 
competitors recruited 230 new members and packed the 1980 NFPA 
 
227 Id. at 129 (“But the question of the need for an injunction will arise in this case only 
if the district court ultimately determines that the Board is not actively supervised and thus 
not immune, and that there has in fact been a violation of the antitrust laws. We therefore 
decline to decide this issue since it may prove unnecessary to the disposition of the case.”). 
See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (discussing the issue of supervision to 
assure that the local government is in compliance with the state’s public policy). 
228 486 U.S. 492 (1988). See also Am. Soc. of Mechanical Eng’rs, Inc., v. Hyrolevel 
Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (ruling that volunteer members of ASME who intentionally 
thwarted their employer’s competitor in a draft statement had violated federal antitrust 
laws on a theory of apparent authority). 
229 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 497. 
230 Id. at 496. 
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meeting, resulting in a narrow—394 to 390—defeat of Indian Head’s 
proposed bid to have its conduits listed in the Code.231 
The economic fallout to Indian Head was palpable. A product not 
listed in the Code might not be included on lists compiled by private, 
national certification laboratories, such as the critically important 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), and therefore would likely not be 
used by electrical contractors or distributors.232 Moreover, insurers are 
also reluctant to underwrite buildings with components not on the UL 
list.233 As importantly, state and local governments routinely adopt the 
Code, often with few changes.234 
Prior to Allied Tube, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
adopted the position that private standard-setting organizations, like 
the NFPA, were quasi-legislative.235 This meant that they too would 
be protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because attempts to 
influence them would be equivalent to lobbying a governmental 
entity. For example, in the 1976 case of Rush-Hampton Industries, 
Inc. v. Home Ventilating Institute,236 a federal district court ruled 
against the plaintiff, a maker of ductless bathroom fans, who sued a 
trade association for slander and for the trade association’s activities 
in constructing the meaning of ventilating devices in its building code 
used by state and local governments.237 The court explained that the 
defendant Institute’s activities were legislative and adjudicatory in 
nature and, therefore, attempts to influence the Institute would be 
protected as if the Institute were a governmental body.238 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Allied Tube assumed a different 
view and clarified how private standard-setting organizations should 
be examined. The Court held that a distinction must be drawn 
between those activities that are political versus those that are 
 
231 Id. at 496–97. 
232 Id. at 495–96. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 495. 
235 See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 573 
F.Supp. 833, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Rush-Hampton Indus. Inc. v. Home Ventilating Inst., 
419 F. Supp. 19, 24 (M.D. Fla. 1976). See generally, Kurt J. Lindower, Note, Noerr-
Pennington Antitrust Immunity and Private Standard-Setting: Allied Tube & Conduit 
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 341, 346 (1989). 
236 419 F. Supp. 19, 19 (M.D. Fla. 1976). 
237 Id. at 20. 
238 See id. at 25; see also Wheeling-Pittburgh Steel Corp., 573 F. Supp. at 833 (Allied 
Tube sued Wheeling alleging that Wheeling’s activities in actions by Underwriters 
Laboratories (UL) that delayed its product’s entry into the market). 
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commercial.239 The inquiry was necessary to determine whether a 
private standard-setting organization should be provided Noerr-
Pennington protection from antitrust laws.240 To make the distinction, 
the Court examined three factors: the source, the context, and the 
nature of the organization’s activities.241 
With respect to source, the Court noted that these organizations 
provide pro-competitive benefits.242 Still, their activities must be 
scrutinized because they consist of economically interested 
companies with vertical and horizontal relationships.243 The Court 
stated this scrutiny was necessary because these organizations, in 
effect, create an “[a]greement on a product standard [which] . . . 
implicitly [is] an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or 
purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, private standard-
setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust 
scrutiny.”244 
Regarding context, the Court noted that Allied Tube’s activities did 
not involve the kind of debates and review typically found in the 
political arena.245 In fact, the Court concluded “[w]hatever de facto 
[governmental] authority the Association enjoys, no official authority 
has been conferred on it by any government, and the decisionmaking 
body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of persons with 
economic incentives to restrain trade.”246 In this case, the Court noted, 
“the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and 
without official authority, many of whom have personal financial 
interests in restraining competition, [thus] we have no difficulty 
concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action.”247 
Lastly, in looking at the nature of Allied’s activities, the Court saw 
those who deal with these organizations as more engaged in decision 
making than petitioning. As the Court explained, 
[the] petitioner did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an 
independent decisionmaker, . . . rather, it organized and orchestrated 
the actual exercise of the Association’s decisionmaking authority in 
 
239 See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499–500. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 499. See also Lindower, supra note 236, at 350. 
242 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 501. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 502. 
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setting a standard. Nor can the setting of the Association’s Code be 
characterized as merely an exercise of the power of persuasion, for 
it in part involves the exercise of market power.248 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that, “[t]he Association’s members, 
after all, include consumers, distributors, and manufacturers of 
electrical conduit, and any agreement to exclude polyvinyl chloride 
conduit from the Code is in part an implicit agreement not to trade in 
that type of electrical conduit.”249 
D. Third-Party Providers and Antitrust Laws: Lessons to be 
Learned from Omni and Allied Tube 
Third-party providers of green building initiatives must now 
maneuver in a similar, albeit not identical, antitrust legal environment 
as those parties discussed in the foregoing cases. The following 
discussion should provide helpful guidance to both national umbrella 
organizations such as the USGBC and GBI and their myriad local 
chapters, which now exist in virtually every major city across the 
country. 
The evolution of cases from Parker to Omni essentially creates 
three possible scenarios.250 The first is the most obvious and long-
standing: when a state, acting as a sovereign, directly restrains trade, 
antitrust laws are not applied.251 This must be contrasted with 
situations when public and private entities with a direct financial 
interest restrain trade.252 Or when, as explained in one case, these 
entities’ activities simply provide “a gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”253 Lastly, 
when a local government with no financial interests restrains trade in 
concert with a private party but does so under clearly articulated state 
 
248 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507. 
249 Id. 
250 See generally Stephanie Ames, City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.: 
The Expansion of State Action Immunity to Municipal Regulation, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 309, 
314 (1992) (outlining scenarios stemming from the Parker-Omni transition). 
251 See supra Part III.A. (discussing the Parker case in which California directly 
attempted to control the price of raisins under its California Agricultural Prorate Act). See 
also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 588 (1988) (examining direct state legislation regulating 
bar admissions in Arizona). 
252 See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (discussing a state 
agency passively accepting a public utility’s tariffs). See also supra Part III.C. (discussing 
Allied Tube and the activities of private organizations engaged in restrains in trade). 
253 California Retail Liquor Dealers, 445 U.S. at 98. Cf. Ames, supra note 250, at 314 
(outlining relationship between states involvement and development of antitrust laws). 
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authorization, antitrust laws do not generally apply, although they are 
subject to the so-called sham exception.254 
A related issue that third-party providers must also heed is the rule 
articulated in Allied Tube. Under that case’s logic, if providers are 
engaged in writing standards and codes, they must differentiate their 
activities between those that are commercial and those that are 
political.255 The activities of third-party providers of green building 
standards, such as reviewing applications, rendering project-specific 
advice, and conferring formal certification, would likely be subject to 
the third scenario. As with the Columbia Outdoor Advertising 
Company, which aggressively lobbied the City of Columbia, third-
party providers will likely be protected from antitrust laws. As the 
Court clearly pointed out in Omni, as long as a private organization is 
pursuing a desired outcome, even one which enriches it by thwarting 
its competition, it will not be subject to antitrust liability.256 This 
assumes of course, that the government in question is acting on 
clearly articulated state authority that is designed to actually 
accomplish an anticompetitive outcome.257 It is only when a third-
party organization, such as the USGBC, as a pretense to legitimate 
lobbying efforts, engages in a quasi-battle of attrition that the process 
would be viewed as falling within the sham exception as provided 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. These efforts might include 
making frivolous claims that its competition is not adhering to 
licensing and other requirements in order to create implementation 
delays and added expenses.258 
When private third-party organizations develop and draft rating 
systems that are subsequently adopted into state and local building 
codes, the rationale of Allied Tube will likely apply. Allied Tube and 
others conspired with like-minded private companies to eliminate a 
product manufactured by the Indian Head Company from being 
included in a building code promulgated by a private trade 
association. The items endorsed by the code were components used in 
private construction that were adopted by many cities and 
 
254 See supra Part III.A. (discussing Omni as well as the important sham exception 
articulated under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
255 See supra Part III. 
256 See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing the Court’s language in Omni). 
257 Id. 
258 See supra Part III.A. (discussing the Omni Court’s application of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to the Columbia Outdoor Advertising’s lobbying activities and why it 
did not constitute a sham). 
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municipalities. Exclusion from the list meant that if a contractor used 
Indian Head’s plastic conduit pipes it would not be “up to code,” 
thereby dissuading contractors from using Indian Head pipes. 
Because Allied Tube’s collusive and anticompetitive activities were 
not political (i.e., not in concert with a local government, but 
commercial with fellow competitors) those activities were not 
protected from antitrust laws.259 
Third-party organizations typically develop and draft the 
parameters of the rating systems that they promulgate, such as what 
types of materials are proper to attain a certain level of certification. 
Indeed, the LEED program creates express requirements for 
certification, such as what is necessary to attain a Platinum, Gold, or 
Silver rating. However, if an independent organization promulgates a 
code for green construction and the USGBC (or its member 
constituents) attempts to use its influence to suppress the inclusion of 
certain building materials or products it has a commercial interest to 
exclude, this would likely be illegal. This is because, under the 
reasoning of Allied Tube, such dealings would likely be viewed as 
more commercial than political in nature.260 
Although there is no evidence that the USGBC or any other private 
organization that promulgates a third-party green building rating 
system has engaged in such conduct, the USGBC has advocated for 
the inclusion of LEED within local legislation.261 This type of activity 
could be protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, but it could 
also be indicative of the type of collusive efforts that might present 
antitrust problems similar to those implicated under Allied Tube.262 
For example, USGBC’s member organizations “participate in annual 
meetings, educational seminars, and actively champion the 
development process for the suite of LEED rating systems.”263 The 
horizontal and vertical business relationships that exist within the 
green building community could thus present the opportunity for 
 
259 See supra Part III.C. (discussing the Allied Tube Court’s rule differentiating political 
from commercial activities). 
260 Id. 
261 See Del Percio, supra note 177, at 254 (stating that “[i]n early 2009, the Cascadia 
chapter of the USGBC e-mailed its members and asked them to call state legislators to 
lobby for them to exclude Green Globes from state-level legislation”). 
262 See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 506 (noting conduct that does “not take place in the 
open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of decision-making, but within the 
confines of a private standard-setting process”). 
263 See Del Percio, supra note 177, at 252. 
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negative influences to exclude certain products or materials from 
future versions of LEED. 
However, it is critical to note that the USGBC states explicitly on 
its website that 
[it] does not certify, endorse or promote products, services or 
companies. . . . We do not award credits based on the use of 
particular products but rather upon meeting the performance 
standards set forth in our rating systems. It is up to project teams to 
determine which products are most appropriate for credit 
achievement and program requirements.264 
Whether this ban will remain in future versions of LEED or other 
third-party rating systems is unclear. Nevertheless, the LEED system 
currently only recognizes wood products certified by the Forest 
Stewardship Council for its Materials and Resources Credit Number 
7.265 Accordingly, as an increasing number of state and local 
governments incorporate the LEED system into legislation, a 
potential antitrust plaintiff could gain ammunition to claim that its 
products or materials are being excluded from the marketplace. 
For example, in Allied Tube, the Court noted the “predicable 
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local 
governments” as the basis for proof of anticompetitive market 
effect.266 According to the most recent statistics from USGBC, 36 
states and 190 local governments have adopted LEED into legislation 
in some capacity. Whether these numbers would be sufficient for 
purposes of maintaining an antitrust claim is unclear, but Allied Tube 
does suggest that policymakers should be flexible in implementing 
green building legislation in order to ensure that a broad range of 
products or materials can be used in a given jurisdiction in order to 
avoid the types of allegations that were advanced in Allied Tube. 
IV 
ASSESSING GOVERNMENT ADOPTION STANDARDS 
Decision makers in jurisdictions looking to add a green or high 
performance building component to their public policy initiatives, or 
to reevaluate those already in place, must consider two different 
issues. First, they need to consider those programs that provide a 
 
264 LEED Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc 
.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1819 (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
265 See Del Percio, supra note 177, at 243–44. 
266 Id. at 249 (citing Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502–03). 
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reliable and high quality system for verifying sustainable construction 
practices.267 Second, they must consider the legal implications of their 
decision, including antitrust issues, in order to avoid costly legal 
battles despite their best intentions.268 
In considering the first issue, many of the early jurisdictional 
adopters of sustainable construction practices chose to invent their 
own programs due to the novelty of their actions or because of legal 
impediments. The AEGB forged new ground when it created its one 
of a kind system in 1985 and gave birth to an innovative approach to 
construction that did not begin to enter the mainstream for another 
fifteen years.269 Similarly, the GBTC chose to create its own program 
as well; LEED was in its infancy when New York decided to pioneer 
financial incentives as an inducement tool for developers who use 
sustainable practices in their projects.270 
Later jurisdictions chose to utilize the LEED program from the 
USGBC exclusively, as many decision makers noticed its track record 
in delivering strong results on both quality and reliability. However, 
as competing programs became viable alternatives, a few jurisdictions 
either evaluated the policy implications of allowing different third-
party programs to provide compliance standards or chose to offer dual 
certifications.271 
Moreover, this natural evolution coincides with the natural 
segmentation of the different construction markets and subspecialties. 
For example, some commentators point out that the LEED program 
provides a better assessment tool for luxury custom residences with 
builders seeking to differentiate themselves from their competition, 
while the NAHB ICC 700 certification excels in evaluating 
production homes and will have a broader impact upon the public.272 
 
267 E.g., AIA CINCINNATTI, supra note 57. 
268 Other legal issues, which are beyond the scope of this particular Article, include 
non-delegation doctrine concerns (handing control of legislation over to a private, 
unregulated third-party entity) and void for vagueness (much green building legislation has 
been written and adopted quickly). See Stephen Del Percio, Legal Issues Arising Out of 
Green Building Legislation, 33 REAL ESTATE ISSUES, No. 3 2008, available at 
www.cre.org/memberdata/pdfs/Legal_Issues.pdf. 
269 See Tuma, supra note 59. 
270 See Kneeland, supra note 72, at 5. 
271 E.g., AIA CINCINNATI, supra note 57; City of Austin, supra note 71. 
272 See Green Rating Systems for Home Building, GREEN BLDG. ADVISOR, available at 
http://www.greenbuildingadvisor.com/green-basics/green-rating-systems-home-building 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (subscription available through author). 
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As such, a jurisdiction must evaluate its decision to use third-party 
verification systems to further its environmental goals with a broader 
market perspective. As with any community that contains its share of 
commercial and residential zoning coupled with affordable and 
affluent subsections, the decision makers need to employ a 
comprehensive strategy. There are positives and negatives with any 
given program, but a jurisdiction needs to mold a policy around a 
variety of third-party systems and not rely on a single provider. This 
way, the marketplace may select an appropriate fit for a given project 
and geographic location while the incentivizing governmental entity 
can rest easy that a certain level of performance will occur. 
In evaluating antitrust and other legal implications of legislating 
green, a jurisdiction must consider the possibility that it may face 
implementation issues—including the possibility of litigation—if it 
selects a single third-party verification system. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
For many jurisdictions, the importance of developing a viable 
program for green building underpinned by a viable certification 
process to ensure its continuing credibility is critical. Yet, like any 
new system, its evolution must be carefully monitored so that it is not 
undermined by unethical and illegal practices among governmental 
bodies, third-party providers, and private sector developers. While the 
default rule is that local governments—the most important consumers 
of the services delivered by third-party providers—are immune from 
antitrust liability, major and potentially dangerous legal exceptions 
exist. As we discuss in this Article, these exceptions range from the 
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to objectionable 
activities by third parties that develop and draft rating systems for 
builders and other trades, as discussed in Allied Tube. Failing to take 
these considerations seriously could impede the impressive progress 
of the green building industry and the undeniable importance that it 
continues to provide to the construction and real estate sectors. 
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